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1. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of capturing and storage devices as well as
the ubiquitous presence of computer networks make shar-
ing of data easier than ever. Such pervasive exchange of data,
however, has increasingly raised questions on how sensitive
and private information can be protected. For example, it is
now commonplace to send private photographs or videos to
the hundreds of online photoprocessing stores for storage,
development, and enhancement like sharpening and red-eye
removal. Few companies provide any protection of the per-
sonal pictures they receive. Hackers or employees of the store
may steal the data for personal use or distribute them for per-
sonal gain without consent from the owner.
There are also security applications in which multiple
parties need to collaborate with each other but do not want
any of their own private data disclosed. Consider the fol-
lowing example: a law-enforcement agency wants to search
for possible suspects in a surveillance video owned by pri-
vate company A, using a proprietary software developed by
another private company B. The three parties involved all
have information they do not want to share with each other:
the criminal biometric database from law enforcement, the
surveillance tape from company A, and the proprietary soft-
ware from company B.
Encryption alone cannot provide adequate protection
when performing the aforementioned applications. The en-
crypted data needs to be decrypted at the receiver for pro-
cessing and the raw data will then become vulnerable. Al-
ternatively, the client can download the software and pro-
cess her private data in a secure environment. This, however,
runs the risk of having the proprietary technology of the soft-
ware company pirated or reverse-engineered by hackers. The
Trusted Computing (TC) Platform may solve this problem by
executing the software in a secure memory space of the client
machine equipped with a cryptographic coprocessor [1]. Be-
sides the high cost of overhauling the existing PC platform,
the TC concept remains highly controversial due to its un-
balanced protection of the software companies over the con-
sumers [2].
The technical challenge to this problem lies in develop-
ing a joint computation and communication protocol to be
executed among multiple distrusted network terminals with-
out disclosing any private information. Such a protocol is
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called a secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocol and
has been an active research area in cryptography for more
than twenty years [3]. Recently, researchers in other disci-
plines such as signal processing and data mining have begun
to use SMC to solve various practical problems. The goal of
this paper is to provide a tutorial on the basic theory of SMC
and to survey recent advances in this area.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The basic framework of SMC is as follows: there are n par-
ties P1,P2, . . . ,Pn on a network who want to compute a joint
function f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) based on private data xi owned by
party Pi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,n. The goal of the SMC is that Pi
will not learn anything about xj for j =i beyond what can be
inferred from her private data xi and the result of the com-
putation f (x1, x2, . . . , xn). SMC can be trivially accomplished
if there is a special server, trusted by every party with its pri-
vate data, to carry out the computation. This is not a practical
solution as it is too costly to protect such a server. The objec-
tive of any SMC protocol is to emulate this ideal model as
much as possible by using clever transformations to conceal
the private data.
Almost all SMC protocols are classified based on their
models of security and adversarial behaviors. The most com-
monly used security models are perfect security and compu-
tational security, which will be covered in Sections 3 and 4,
respectively. Adversarial behaviors are broadly classified into
two types: semihonest and malicious. A dishonest party is
called semihonest if she follows the SMC protocol faithfully
but attempts to find out about other’s private data through
the communication. A malicious party, on the other hand,
will modify the protocol to gain extra information. We will
focus primarily on semihonest adversaries but briefly de-
scribe how the protocols can be fortified to handle malicious
adversaries.
We also assume that private data are elements from a fi-
nite field F and the target function f (·) can be implemented
as a combination of the field’s addition and multiplication.
This is a reasonably general computational model for two
reasons: first, at the lowest level, any digital computing device
can be modeled by setting F as the binary field with the XOR
as addition and AND as multiplication. Second, while most
signal processing and scientific computation are described
using real numbers, we can approximate the real numbers
with a reasonably large finite field and estimate any analytical
function using a truncated version of its power series expan-
sion, which consists of only additions and multiplications.
3. SMC WITH PERFECT SECURITY
In this section, we discuss perfectly secure multiparty com-
putation (PSMC) in which an adversary will learn nothing
about the secret numbers of the honest parties no matter
how computationally powerful the adversary is. The idea is
that while the adversary may control a number of parties who
receive messages from other honest senders, these messages
provide no useful information about the secret numbers of
the senders.
One of the basic tools used in PSMC is secret sharing.
A t-out-of-m secret-sharing scheme breaks a secret num-
ber x into mshares r1, r2, . . . , rm such that x cannot be recon-
structed unless an adversary obtains more than t − 1 shares
with t ≤ m. The importance of a secret-sharing scheme in
PSMC is illustrated by the following example: in a 2-party
secure computation of f (x1, x2), party Pi will use a 2-out-
of-2 secret-sharing scheme to break xi into ri1 and ri2, and
share ri j with party Pj . Each party then computes the func-
tion using the shares received, resulting in y1  f (r11, r21)
at P1 and y2  f (r12, r22) at P2. If the secret-sharing scheme
is homomorphic under the function f (·), that is, y1 and y2
are themselves secret shares of the desired function f (x1, x2),
f (x1, x2) can then be easily computed by exchanging y1 and
y2 between the two parties. Under our computational model,
all SMC problems can be solved if the secret-sharing scheme
is doubly homomorphic—it preserves both addition and mul-
tiplication. One such scheme was invented by Adi Shamir
which we will explain next [4].
In Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, a party hides her se-
cret number x as the constant term of a secret polynomial
g(z) of degree t − 1,
g(z)  at−1zt−1 + at−2zt−2 + · · · + a1z + x. (1)
The coeﬃcients a1 to at−1 are random coeﬃcients distributed
uniformly over the entire field. Given the polynomial g(z),
the secret number x can be recovered by evaluating it at
z = 0. The secret shares are computed by evaluating g(z) at
z = 1, 2, . . . ,m and are distributed to m other parties. It is as-
sumed that each party knows the degree of g(z) and the value
z at which her share is evaluated. We follow the convention
that the share received by party Pi is evaluated at z = i.
If an adversary obtains any t shares g(z1), g(z2), . . . , g(zt)




















We claim that ĝ(z) is identical to the secret polynomial g(z):
first, the degree ĝ(z) is t − 1, same as that of g(z). Second,
ĝ(z) = g(z) for z = z1, z2, . . . , zt because, when evaluating
ĝ(z) at a particular z = zi, every term inside the summa-
tion in (2) will go to zero except for the one that contains
g(zi) it simply becomes g(zi) as the multiplier becomes one.
Consequently, the (t − 1)th-degree polynomial g(z) − ĝ(z)
will have t roots. As the number of roots is higher than the
degree, g(z) − ĝ(z) must be identically zero or ĝ(z) ≡ g(z).
As a result, the adversary can reconstruct the secret number
x = ĝ(0).
On the other hand, the adversary will have no knowledge
about x even if it possesses as many as t − 1 shares. This is
because, for any arbitrary secret number x′, there exists a
polynomial h(z) such that h(0) = x′ and h(zi) = g(zi) for
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i = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1. h(z) is given as follows and its properties is































Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme is obviously homomor-
phic under addition: given two secret (t − 1)th-degree poly-
nomials g(z) and h(z), the secret shares of g(z) + h(z) are
simply the summation of their respective secret shares g(1) +
h(1), g(2)+h(2), . . . , g(m)+h(m). Secrecy is also maintained
as the coeﬃcients of g(z) +h(z), except for the constant term
which is the sum of all the secret numbers, are uniformly dis-
tributed and no party can gain additional knowledge about
others’ secret shares. On the other hand, the degree of the
product polynomial g(z)h(z) increases to 2(t−1). The locally
computed shares g(1)h(1), g(2)h(2), . . . , g(m)h(m) cannot
completely specify g(z)h(z) unless the number of shares m
is strictly larger than 2(t − 1) or equivalently, t ≤ m/2.
Even if this condition is satisfied, a series of product can eas-
ily result in a polynomial with degree higher than m. Fur-
thermore, the coeﬃcients of the product polynomial is not
entirely random, for example, they are related in such a way
that the polynomial can be factored by the original polyno-
mials. These problems can be solved by first assuming that
t ≤ m/2 and then replacing the product polynomial by a
new (t − 1)th-degree polynomial as follows.
Pi first computes g(i)h(i) and then generates a random
(t − 1)th-degree polynomial qi(z) with qi(0) = g(i)h(i).
Again, using the secret-sharing scheme, Pi sends share qi( j)
to party Pj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. This step leaks no information
about the local product g(i)h(i). In the final step, Pi computes





γ jq j(i), (4)





γ jg( j)h( j). (5)
Before explaining how Pi can solve (5) without knowing
g(0)h(0) and g( j)h( j) for j =i, we first note that di for i =






γ jq j(z). (6)
The coeﬃcients of q(z) are uniformly random as they are
linear combinations of uniformly distributed coeﬃcients of






























Party 1 Party 2 Party 3
Figure 1: This diagram shows how three parties can share
the secret g(0)h(0) based on the locally computed products
g(1)h(1), g(2)h(2), and g(3)h(3).
The second last equality is because g( j)h( j) is the secret
number hidden by the polynomial qj(z). The last equality
is based on (5). This implies that di for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m are
secret shares of the scalar g(0)h(0). An example of the above
protocol in a three-party situation is shown in Figure 1.
To address how each party can solve (5), we note that,
based on our assumption t ≤ m/2 the degree of the prod-
uct polynomial g(z)h(z) is strictly smaller than the number
of shares m. Let g(z)h(z) = am−1zm−1 + · · · + a0. The coef-
ficients ai’s are completely determined by the values g(z)h(z)
at z = 1, 2, . . . ,m. In other words, the following matrix equa-
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The m × m invertible matrix V is called the Vandermonde
matrix and it is a constant matrix. Taking its inverse W =
V−1 and considering the last row entries Wmi for i =




Wmig(i)h(i) = a0 = g(0)h(0). (9)
Comparing (9) with (5), we haveWmi = γi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
which are constants.
The condition t ≤ m/2 on using Shamir’s scheme in
PSMC posts a restriction on the number of dishonest parties
tolerated—it implies that the number of honest parties must
be a strict majority. In particular, we cannot use this scheme
for a two-party SMC in which one party has to assume that
the other party is dishonest. A surprising result in [5] shows
that the condition t ≤ m/2 is not a weakness of Shamir’s
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scheme—in fact, except for certain trivial functions,1 it is im-
possible to compute any f (x1, x2, . . . , xm) with perfect security
if the number of dishonest parties equals to or exceeds m/2.
To conclude this section, we briefly describe how PSMC
protocols can be modified to handle malicious parties. There
are two types of disruption: first, a malicious party can out-
put erroneous results and second, she may perform an incon-
sistent secret-sharing scheme such as evaluating the polyno-
mial at random points. Provided the number of malicious
parties is less than one third of the total number of par-
ties, the first problem can be solved by replacing (2) with a
robust extrapolation scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes
[5]. This bound on the number of malicious parties can be
raised to one half by combining interactive zero-knowledge
proof with a broadcast channel [6]. The second problem can
be solved by using a verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) scheme
in which the sender needs to provide auxiliary information
so that the receivers can verify the consistency of their shares
without gaining knowledge of the secret number [5].
4. SMC WITH COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY
It is unsatisfactory that PSMC introduced in Section 3 can-
not even provide secure two-party computation. Instead of
relying on perfect security, modern cryptographical tech-
niques primarily use the so-called computational security
model. Under this model, secrets are protected by encoding
them based on a mathematical function whose inverse is dif-
ficult to compute without the knowledge of a secret key. Such
a function is called one-way trapdoor function and the con-
cept is used in many public-key cipher: a sender who wants
to send a message m to party P will first compute a cipher-
text c = E(m, k) based on the publicly known encryption
algorithm E(·)’s and P’s advertised public key k. The encryp-
tion algorithm acts as a one-way trapdoor function because
a computationally bounded eavesdropper will not be able to
recover m given only c and k. On the other hand, P can re-
cover m by applying a decoding algorithm D(E(m, k), s) = m
using her secret key s. Unlike perfectly secure protocols in
which the adversary simply does not have any information
about the secret, the adversary in the computationally secure
model is unable to decrypt the secret due to the computa-
tional burden in solving the inverse problem. Even though
it is still a conjecture that true one-way trapdoor functions
exist and future computation platforms like quantum com-
puter may drastically change the landscape of these func-
tions, many one-way function candidates exist and are rou-
tinely used in practical security systems.2
The most fundamental result in SMC is that it is possible
to design general computationally secure multiparty compu-
tation (CSMC) protocols to handle arbitrary number of dis-
honest parties [3]. In this section, we will discuss the basic
construction of these protocols. Similar to Section 3, we con-
1 The exceptions are those functions that are separable or f (x1, x2, . . . ,
xm) = f1(x1) f2(x2) · · · fm(xm).
2 A list of one-way function candidates can be found in [7, Chapter 1].
Table 1: OT table at P1.
Key Values
0 −u
1 1r11 − u
2 2r11 − u
...
...
r22 r22r11 − u
...
...
N − 2 (N − 2)r11 − u
N − 1 (N − 1)r11 − u
sider the protocols for addition and multiplication in finite
fields. We will concentrate on the canonical two-party case
but our construction can be easily extended to more than
two parties. Our starting point of building general CSMC is
a straightforward secret-sharing scheme: each secret number
is simply broken down as a sum of two uniformly distributed
random numbers: x1 = r11 + r12 and x2 = r21 + r22. Pi then
sends ri j to Pj for j =i. This scheme is clearly homomorphic
under addition









Multiplication, on the other hand, introduces cross-term
r11r22 which breaks the homomorphism the homomorphism
x1x2 = r11r21 + r12x2 + r11r22. (11)
While the first two terms can be locally computed by P1 and
P2, respectively, it is impossible to compute the third term
r11r22 without having one party revealed the actual secret
number to the other. In order to accomplish this under the
computational security model, we will make use of a general
cryptographic protocol called the oblivious transfer (OT).
A 1-out-of-N OT protocol allows one party (the chooser)
to read one entry from a table with N entries hosted by an-
other party (the sender). Provided that both parties are com-
putationally bounded, the OT protocol prevents the chooser
from reading more than one entry and the sender from
knowing the chooser’s choice. We first show how the OT
protocol can be used to break r11r22 in (11) into random
shares u and v such that r11r22 = u + v. Assume our fi-
nite field has N elements. The sender P1 generates a ran-
dom u and then creates a table T with N entries shown in
Table 1.3 Using the OT protocol, the chooser P2 selects the
entry v  T(r22) = r22r11 − u without letting P1 know her
selection or inspecting any other entries in the table.
It remains to show how OT provides the security guaran-
tee. A 1-out-of-N OT protocol consists of the following five
steps.
(1) P1 sends N randomly generated public keys k0, k1, . . . ,
kN−1 to P2.
3 The role of P1 and P2 can be interchanged with proper adjustment to
Table 1 entries.
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(2) P2 selects kr22 based on her secret number r22, encrypts
her public key k′ using kr22 , and sends E(k′, kr22 ) back
to P1.
(3) As P1 does not know P2’s key selection, P1 decodes
the incoming message using all possible keys or ̂k′i =
D(E(k′, kr22 ), si) with private keys si for i = 0, 1, . . . ,
N − 1. Only one of ̂k′i ’s (̂k′r22 ) matches the real key k′
but P1 has no knowledge of it.
(4) P1 encrypts each table entry T(i) using ̂k′i and sends
E(T(i), ̂k′i ) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1 to P2.
(5) P2 decrypts the r22th message using her private key s′:
D(E(T(r22),̂k′r22 ), s
′) = T(r22) as k′r22 = k′ is the public
key corresponding to the secret key s′. P2 then obtains
her random share of v = T(r22) = r22r11 − u. Note
that P2 will not be able to decrypt any other message
E(T(i), ̂k′i ) for i=r22 as it requires the knowledge of P1’s
secret key si.
It is clear from the above procedure that OT can accomplish a
table lookup secure to both P1 and P2. As the definition of the
table is arbitrary, OT can support secure two-party computa-
tion of any finite field function. Following similar procedures
as in Section 3, the above construction can be extended using
standard zero-knowledge proof and verifiable secret-sharing
scheme to handle malicious parties that do not follow the
prescribed protocols [8, Chapter 7].
5. RECENT ADVANCES
In Sections 3 and 4, we present the construction of general
SMC protocols under the perfect security model and the
computational security model. While most of these results
are established in 1980s, SMC continues to be a very active re-
search area in cryptography and its applications begin to ap-
pear in many other disciplines. Recent advances focus on bet-
ter understanding of the security strength of individual pro-
tocols and their composition, improving CSMC protocols in
terms of their computation complexity [9, 10] and commu-
nication cost [11–14], relating SMC to error-correcting cod-
ing [15, 16], and introducing SMC to a variety of applica-
tions [17–22]. The rigorous study of protocol security is be-
yond the scope of this paper, and thus we will focus on the
remaining three topics.
5.1. Reduction of computation complexity and
communication cost
Both the computation complexity and communication cost
of the 1-out-of-N OT protocol depend linearly on the size
N of the sender’s table that defines the function—it requires
O(N) invocations of a public-key cipher and O(N) messages
exchanged between the sender and the chooser. In many
practical applications, the value of N could be very large.
For example, computing a general function on 32-bit com-
puters requires a table of N= 232 or more than four billion
entries! This renders our basic version of OT hopelessly im-
practical. Improving the computation eﬃciency and reduc-
ing the communication requirement of OT and other CSMC
protocols thus become the focus of intensive research eﬀort.
In [9], Naor and Pinkas showed that the 1-out-of-N OT
protocol can be reduced to applying a 1-out-of-2 OT proto-
col log2N times. The idea is that the two parties repeatedly
use the 1-out-of-2 OT on individual bits of the binary repre-
sentation of the chooser’s secret number x2: in the ith round,
the sender will present two keys Ki0 and Ki1 to the chooser
who will choose Kix2[i] based on x2[i], the ith bit of x2. The
keys Ki0 and Ki1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , log2N are used by the sender
to encrypt the table entries T(k) using the binary representa-













where k is a log N-bit number, f (s) is a random number gen-
erated by seed s, and ⊕ denotes XOR. The entire encrypted
table is sent to the chooser. Since the chooser already knows















The same authors further improved the computation
complexity of the 1-out-of-2 OT protocol in [10]. They
showed that it is possible to use one exponentiation, the most
complex operation in a public-key cipher, for any number of
simultaneous invocations of the 1-out-of-2 OT at the cost
of increasing the communication overhead. Their public-key
cipher is based on the assumed diﬃculty of the Decisional
Diﬃe-Hellman problem whose encryption process enables
the sender to prepare all her encrypted messages with one
exponentiation without any loss of secrecy.
An aspect that the above algorithms do not address is
the communication requirement of general CSMC protocols.
There are three diﬀerent facets to the communication prob-
lem. First, our basic version of the 1-out-of-N OT protocol
requires the sender to send N random keys and N encrypted
messages to the chooser. The random keys can be considered
as setup cost, provided that the sender changes her random
share u and the chooser changes her key k′ in every invoca-
tion of the protocol. However, it seems necessary to send the
N encrypted messages every time as the messages depend on
u. A closer examination reveals that all the chooser needs is
one particular message that corresponds to her secret num-
ber. The entire set of N messages is sent simply to obfuscate
her choice from the sender. This subproblem of obfuscating a
selection from a public data collection is called private infor-
mation retrieval (PIR). PIR attracts much research interest
lately and is treated in Section 5.2. It suﬃces to know that
there are techniques that can reduce the communication cost
from O(N) to O(logN) [23].
The second facet involves the communication cost of the
original unsecured implementation of the target function.
The CSMC protocols in Section 4 provide a systematic pro-
cedure to secure each addition and multiplication operation
in the original implementation. However, not all operations
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need to be secured—local operations can be performed with-
out any modification. As such, it is important to minimize
the number of cross-party operations that need to be forti-
fied with the OT protocol. Consider the following example:
P1 and P2, each with n/2 secret numbers, want to find the
median of the entire set of n numbers. The best known unse-
cured algorithm to find the median requires O(n) compari-
son operations. To make this algorithm secure, we can use the
1-out-of-N OT protocol to implement each comparison,4 re-
sulting in communication requirement of O(n logN). This,
however, is not the optimal solution—a distributed median-
finding algorithm requires much less communication [13].
The idea is to have P1 and P2 first compared with their re-
spective local medians. The party with the the larger me-
dian can then discard the half of the local data larger than
the local median—the global median cannot be in this por-
tion of the local data as the global median must be smaller
than the larger of the two local medians. Following the same
logic, the other party can discard the smaller half of her lo-
cal data. The two parties again compare their local medi-
ans of the remaining data until exhaustion. Notice that all
the local computation can be done without invocations of
OT. As a result, this algorithm only requires O(log n) cross-
party secure comparison and this results in a communi-
cation cost of O(log n logN), a significant reduction from
the naive implementation. In fact, it has been shown that if
a communication-eﬃcient unsecured implementation exists
for a general function, we can always convert it into a secure
one without much increase in communication [12].
The final facet of communication requirements has to do
with the interactivity of the CSMC protocols. All the pro-
tocols introduced thus far require multiple rounds of com-
munications between the parties. Such frequent interaction
is undesirable in many applications such as batch processing
in which one party needs to reuse many times the same se-
cret information from another party, and asymmetric com-
putation in which a low-complexity client wants to leverage
a sophisticated server to privately perform a complex com-
putation. Earlier work in this area showed that one round of
message exchange is indeed possible for secure computation
of any function [11]. However, the length of the replied mes-
sage depends on the complexity of the implementation of the
function. As a result, this requires the end receiver to devote
much time in decoding the message even though the output
can be as small as a binary decision. This problem can be re-
solved using a doubly homomorphic public-key encryption
scheme in which arbitrary computation can be done on the
encrypted data without size expansion. It is an open problem
in cryptography on whether a doubly homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme exists. The closest scheme, which we will explain
next, can support arbitrary numbers of additions and one
multiplication on encrypted data [14].
The construction is based on two public-key ciphers de-
fined on two diﬀerent finite cyclic groups G and ̂G of the
same size n = q1q2, where q1 and q2 are large private primes.
4 Secure comparison is also called the Secure Millionaire Problem, one of
the earliest problems studied in SMC literature [3].
These two groups are related by a special bilinear map e :
G×G→ ̂G such that e(uα, vβ) = e(u, v)αβ for arbitrary u, v ∈ G
and integers α,β.5 Furthermore, e(g, g) is a generator for ̂G
if g is a generator for G. The public keys for the cipher de-
fined on G are a generator g and a random h = gαq2 for
some α. The public keys for the cipher on ̂G are ĝ = e(g, g)
and ̂h = e(g,h) = ĝαq2 . Given a message m, the sender
generates a random integer r and computes the ciphertext
C = gmhr ∈ G. To decrypt this ciphertext, the receiver first
removes the random factor by raising C to the power of the
private key q1:
Cq1 = (gmhr)q1 = (gq1)mgαq2rq1 = (gq1)m, (14)
where we use the basic fact gq1q2 = gn = 1 from group theory.
Provided that the message space is small enough, the receiver
can then retrieve m by computing the discrete logarithm of
Cq1 base gq1 . The security of the cipher is based on the as-
sumed hardness of the so-called subgroup decision problem
of which we refer the readers to the original paper [14]. We
now focus on the homomorphic properties of this scheme.
Given two ciphertext messages C1 = gm1hr1 and C2 = gm2hr2 ,
it is easy to see that C1C2 = gm1+m2hr1+r2 which is the cipher-
text of message m1 + m2. For multiplication, we apply the




) = e(gm1hr1 , gm2hr2)





The last expression is clearly a ciphertext for m1m2. Unfortu-
nately, e(C1,C2) belongs to ̂G, not in G. This means that one
cannot further combine this with other ciphertexts in G and
as such this scheme falls short of being a completely homo-
morphic encryption scheme.
5.2. Private information retrieval
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols allow a party (a
user) to select a record from a database owned by another
party (a server) without the server knowing the selection of
the user. PIR is a step in OT as explained in Section 5.1. Un-
like OT, PIR does not prevent the sender from obtaining in-
formation about the collection beyond her choice. Due to its
asymmetric protection, the paradigm of PIR is useful for pri-
vacy protection of ordinary citizens in using search engine,
shopping at online stores, participating in public survey and
electronic voting. As we have seen in Section 5.1, the sim-
plest form of PIR is to send the entire database to the user.
This imposes a communication cost in the order of the size
5 An example of such construction is based on the modified Weil paring on
the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 1 defined over a finite field [14].
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of the database. Recent advances in PIR protocols, however,
show that the goal can be accomplished with a much smaller
communication overhead.
The problem of PIR was first proposed in the seminal pa-
per by Chor et al. as follows [24]: the server has an n-bit bi-
nary string x, and a user wants to know x[i], the ith bit of x,
without the server knowing about i. The first important re-
sult shown in [24] is that, under the perfect security model,
it is impossible to send less data than the trivial solution of
sending the entire x to the user. On the other hand, if iden-
tical databases are available at k ≥ 2 noncolluding servers,
then perfect security can be achieved with the communica-
tion cost of O(n1/k). Their results are based on the following
basic two-server scheme that allows a user to privately obtain








S∪ {a}, if a ∈ S,
S \ {a}, if a ∈ S.
(16)
The user first randomly selects the indexes j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}
with probability of 1/2 for each value of j, to form a set S.
Next, the user computes S⊗i, where i is the desired index. The
user then sends S to server one and S⊗ i to server two. Upon
receiving S, server one replies to the user with a single bit
which is the result of XORing of all the bits in the positions
specified by S. Similarly, server two replies to the user with
a single bit which is the result of XORing of all the bits in
the positions specified by S⊗ i. The user then computes x[i]
by XORing the two bits received from the two servers. This
scheme works because every position j =i will appear twice—
one in S and one in S⊗ i, therefore the result from XORing of
all x[ j]’s together will be 0. On the other hand, i appears only
once in either S or S⊗ i, therefore the result of XORing of all
x[ j]’s and x[i] will be x[i]. Provided the two servers do not
collude, every bit is equally likely to be selected by the user. In
this scheme, each server sends one bit to the user but the user
has to send an n-bit message6 to each server. Thus, the overall
communication cost is still O(n). With minor modification,
this basic scheme can be extended to reduce the number of
bits sent by the user to O(n1/k) [24].
Recently, an interesting connection is made between PIR
and a special type of forward-error-correcting codes (FEC)
called locally decodable codes (LDC) and it has created a
flurry of interest in the information theory community [16].
FEC is used to combat transmission errors by adding redun-
dancy to the transmitted data. Formally, the sender uses an
encoding function C(·) to map an n-bit message x to an m-
bit message C(x) with m > n, and then sends C(x) over a
noisy channel. Upon receiving a string y possibly diﬀerent
from C(x), a receiver attempts to recover x using a decoding
algorithm D(C(x)). In the conventional FEC, it will takes at
least O(n) complexity to recover an n-bit x since O(n) is re-
quired just to record x. LDC, on the other hand, allows the
6 The message is simply an n-bit number with ones indicating the desired
bit.
user to inspect only a small fraction of C(x), say k  n bits,
in order to fully recover a specific bit x[i] in x. Furthermore,
each bit in C(x) can be used in a k-bit subset to recover x[i].
As such, the knowledge of a particular bit in C(x) being used
provides no information about which x[i] is being recovered.
To see how LDC is used in PIR, we assume that each of the
k servers has the same m-bit C(x) generated using an LDC
encoding function on the n-bit database x. In order to re-
trieve x[i], the user sends q1, q2, . . . , qk ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, the
locations of bits in C(x) needed to recover x[i], to each of
the k servers, respectively. Note that these locations depend
only on i and the particular LDC used. Upon receiving qj ,
the jth server simply replies with C(x)[qj] for j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
After gathering all the k replies, the user can then run the de-
coding algorithm to recover x[i]. Using this framework, the
communication cost of the PIR system is k(l + logm) with
klogm and kl corresponded to the user’s and server’s com-
munication costs, respectively.
In fact, the two-server basic scheme introduced earlier
can be viewed as using the Hadamard code in the LDC
framework. The Hadamard code H(x) of an n-bit message






x[ j]k[ j]. (17)
To retrieve x[i] from the servers, the user first randomly picks
an n-bit number k, and then sends k to server one and k ⊕ ei
to server two, where ei is an n-bit number with a single one
in the ith position. Upon receiving k and k ⊕ ei, servers one
and two reply with H(x)[k] and H(x)[k ⊕ ei], respectively.












= x[i](k[i]⊕∼k[i]) = x[i].
(18)
The symbol ∼ denotes negation. This scheme is almost
equivalent to the scheme by Chor et al., except that the XOR
of all possible selections of bits in x are already contained in
the Hadamard code H(x). We mention again that the com-
munication cost of this scheme is O(n) due to the exponen-
tial code length of the Hadamard code. Nevertheless, the pos-
sibility of using better error-correcting codes in the place of
the Hadamard code opens many opportunities for new PIR
schemes. PIR schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes and
Reed-Muller codes can be found in [16]. The best published
result on PIR uses LDC to achieve a communication com-
plexity of O(n10
−7
) with three noncolluding servers [25].
All of the above constructions provide PIR under the per-
fect security model. By making certain computational as-
sumptions, PIR can also achieve sublinear communication
complexity with only one database [23, 26]. We briefly re-
view the scheme in [26] as follows: it is based on the assumed
hardness of determining whether a number in a finite field
8 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
F is a quadratic residue, that is, without knowing the prime




1 if u = v2 for some v ∈ F,
0 otherwise.
(19)
It is easy to see that QR(·) is homomorphic under multipli-
cation, that is, QR(xy) = QR(x)QR(y). The basic principle
of using QR to retrieve x[i] is straightforward: the user sends
the server n numbers y1, . . . , yn ∈ F, all of them quadratic
residues except yi, that is, QF(yj) = 1 for j =i and QF(yi) =
0. The server then replies with m ∈ F computed as follows:
m  Πnj=1wj , where wj =
{
yj if x[ j] = 0,
y2j if x[ j] = 1.
(20)
Since all yj ’s are quadratic residues except for yi, we have
QR(wj) = 1 for j =i and QR(wi) = x[i]. Combining the
homomorphic property, we get the desired result QR(m) =
QR(wi) = x[i]. This scheme, however, is very wasteful as the
user needs to send n logN bits. We can improve this by rear-
ranging x as an s× t matrix M with s = n(L−1)/L and t = n1/L
for some integer L. Assume that x[i] is the entry at the ath
row and the bth column of M. The user then sends the server
yj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , t, all quadratic residues except for yb. The
communication for this step is O(n1/L). Using these t num-
bers, the server carries a similar computation as (20) for each
row of M, resulting in mk for k = 1, 2, . . . , s. Of all the mk’s,
all the user needs is ma from the ath row because it is suﬃ-
cient to retrieve x[i] as QR(ma) = x[i]. Since each of the mk
is a logN-bit number, this is equivalent to carrying out the
PIR procedure logN times—but this time the database size
shrinks from n to s = n(L−1)/L. This observation allows the
same procedure to be applied recursively with exponentially
decreasing communication cost. As a result, the communi-
cation is dominated by the first step which is O(n1/L) and we
can make L as big as we want. Subsequent work by Cachin
et al. showed that the communication cost can be further re-
duced to logarithmic complexity [23].
5.3. Practical applications of SMC
While the theoretical studies of SMC have advanced signif-
icantly in recent years, developing practical applications us-
ing SMC has been slow. The data mining community is the
first to introduce SMC into practical usage. The goal is to
compute aggregate statistics over private data stored in dis-
tributed databases. Using the OT protocol as the core, dif-
ferent SMC protocols have been developed to construct lin-
ear algebra routines [27], median computation [13], deci-
sion trees [17], neural network [19], and others. Even though
these algorithms provide innovative implementations for
many data mining schemes, their security relies on modular
arithmetic operations on very large integers which are com-
putationally intensive. In a recent study on PIR, the authors
of [28] showed that even with the most advanced CPUs, the
modular arithmetic in the SMC protocol requires more time















Figure 2: Original signal and least-square estimates in secure inner
product.
While an algorithm in a typical data mining applica-
tion may need to handle millions of records on a daily ba-
sis, a real-time signal processing algorithm needs to handle
millions of samples within milliseconds. Very eﬃcient algo-
rithms have recently been developed at the expense of pri-
vacy. The pioneering work by Avidan and Moshe showed
the feasibility of building a secure distributed face detector
[20]. While keeping OT as the core, they provide an eﬃcient
implementation based on the assumption that certain visual
features used in the detector are noninvertible and for this
they do not leak important information about the images.
Another noteworthy scheme is a collection of statistical
routines, developed in [18], that use linear subspace projec-
tion for privacy projection. We illustrate the idea with a sim-
ple inner product computation. Assume that two parties, P1
and P2, have n-dimensional vectors x1 and x2, respectively.
They both know an invertible matrix M and its inverse M−1.
M is broken down into top and bottom halves T ∈ Rn/2×n
and B ∈ R(n−n/2)×n, while M−1 into left and right halves
L ∈ Rn×n/2 and R ∈ Rn×(n−n/2). The inner product xT1 x2
can then be decomposed as follows:
xT1 x2 = xT1 M−1Mx2 = xT1 LTx2 + xT1 RBx2. (21)
P1 then sends xT1 R to P2 who computes x
T
1 RBx2 while P2
sends P1Tx2 so that she can compute xT1 LTx2. P2 can then
send his scalar to P1 or vice versa to obtain the final answer.
They cannot recover each other’s data as the transmitted data
xT1 R and Tx2 are all n/2-dimensional vectors. Using a ran-
domly generated M and x1 = x2, Figure 2 shows the least
square estimates by both parties based on the received data.
Following a similar approach, we have also developed secure
two-party routines for linear filtering [21] and thresholding
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[22]. Even though all of the above algorithms are computa-
tionally very eﬃcient, they all leak private information to a
certain degree and thus may not be suitable for applications
that demand the utmost privacy and security.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have briefly reviewed the foundation of
SMC protocols and some of the latest developments. As we
do not assume any background in cryptography, we focus on
the intuition rather than the rigorous treatment of the sub-
ject. Serious readers should consult the comprehensive text
of [8] and the collection of papers at specialized bibliogra-
phy sites [29, 30]. As the demand for secure and privacy-
enhancing applications is rapidly growing, we believe that it
is a great opportunity for researchers in diverse areas outside
of cryptography to understand the concepts of SMC and to
develop practical SMC protocols for their respective applica-
tions.
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